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Gaze is a socially relevant signal that can influence attentional orienting in the observer. Gaze 
studies have verified that gaze cueing effect (that is, attentional shift to the same direction the gaze 
is pointing at) is highly reflexive, but it is not entirely immune to top-down controlling, such as 
mental state attributions. Direct gaze, as an arousing and socially relevant stimulus, can capture and 
hold attention making it more difficult to disengage from it. Studies examining gaze and attention 
have commonly used pictures of faces or schematic faces as stimuli. However, some studies have 
found that using pictures of faces instead of actual live faces may lose some of the social effects 
governing mentalizing processes elicited in the observer.  
     In the present study we investigated if mental beliefs of being seen affect attentional orienting 
triggered by a live model's gaze direction. The dependent measure in this study was participants’ 
(n=20) manual reaction time to laterally presented target stimulus. The study consisted of two 
different tasks: a classic gaze cueing task (model posing laterally averted gazes) and another task to 
investigate if direct gaze captures and holds the attention (in this task the model posed either 
straight or downward averted gaze). The participants’ assignment was to look at the model through 
a computer controlled shutter and react to an LED that lit either on the left or on the right of the 
shutter. Once the participant saw the LED lit, they pressed a button and their reaction times were 
analyzed. Both tasks were conducted in two conditions: one where the participants believed the 
model could see through the shutter (see through -condition) and another where they believed the 
model could not see through the shutter because of a one-way mirror (blocked vision -condition). 
The participants also filled out questionnaires about social presence. 
     In the classic gaze cueing task, the gaze cueing effect was observed in both conditions (see 
through – and blocked vision-condition) and there were no significant differences in reaction times 
between the conditions. There was no difference in self-reported social presence between the two 
conditions. In the attentional capture task, reaction times were actually shorter for direct gaze than 
to downward gaze at the stimulus onset asynchrony of 500 ms. Self-reported social presence was 
higher for see through -condition than for blocked vision -condition. 
     The results in the gaze cueing task did not replicate previous findings that attributing “seeing” 
mental state to the model would enhance the cueing effect. More research is needed to identify the 
top-down control processes that may modulate gaze cueing. In the attentional capture task, we were 
unable to replicate previous finding, that perceiving direct gaze would capture and hold the 
attention of the observer thus resulting in longer reaction times to direct compared to downward 
gaze. More research is needed in this area as well. Using live models instead of faces should 
continue to be pursued when studying social cognition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Gaze is a powerful social signal, and it is used to regulate interaction, express intimacy, and exert 
social control among other things (Kleinke, 1986).  People read a lot into gaze: for example liking, 
attraction, attentiveness, and even competence are evaluated partly based on gazing behavior. 
Human eyes are unique compared to the eyes of other primates: the human sclera (the white part of 
the eye surrounding the iris) is more exposed than in other primates making the detection of gaze 
direction easier (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 1997). Humans are very accurate at determining other 
peoples’ gaze direction (Gamer & Hecht, 2007; Symons, Lee, Kedrone & Nishimura, 2004) and 
gaze discrimination behavior starts at a young age: even infants as young as two days old are able to 
discriminate straight gaze from averted gaze (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002). Children 
start to show gaze cueing behavior few months after birth (Farroni, Johnson, Brockbank, & Simion, 
2000; Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998) and it seems that at the age of six months the infants start to 
understand the communicative function of the gaze (Senju & Csibra, 2008).  
     Following others’ gaze direction has at least three functions (Nummenmaa, 2011). Firstly, we 
can detect important stimuli or events in our environment that we might have otherwise missed. 
Secondly, we can predict the intentions of others faster and more accurately since gaze gives us 
information about their interests and goals (this ability to understand the mental states of others is 
called theory of mind; see for example Baron-Cohen, 1995). Thirdly, gaze following is the basis for 
joint (or shared) attention, which is pivotal to social learning and exchanging thoughts about objects 
in our perceivable environment. Given the importance of perceiving others’ gaze, it is not surprising 
that it has effects on our attention, which we will discuss next.  
 
 
Gaze direction and attention 
 
 
There is a large amount of evidence that seeing a laterally averted gaze shifts viewers’ attention 
automatically to the same direction the gaze is pointing at (eg. Driver et al. 1999; Hietanen, 1999; 
Schuller & Rossion, 2001, 2004). This phenomenon is known as gaze cueing. The phenomenon is 
 2 
so strong that it is observed even when it would be more beneficial to shift attention to the opposite 
direction the gaze is cueing at (Downing, Dodds, & Bray, 2004; Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 
2004). Although cueing can be produced also with other directional cues, such as arrows (eg. 
Friesen et al., 2004; Hietanen, Leppänen, Nummenmaa, & Astikainen, 2008; Ristic, Friesen, & 
Kingstone, 2002), there has been a debate that gaze cueing is special compared to other kind of 
directional cues. Cueing effect can be slightly stronger for gaze cues than for symbolic cues 
(Friesen et al., 2004), and gaze cueing disappears when the contrast polarity of the eyes is reversed, 
which is not to be expected to happen with other kind of cues (Ricciardelli, Betta, Pruner, & 
Turatto, 2009). It has been suggested that although symbolic cues and gaze cues can produce 
seemingly similar behavioral effects (that is, attentional shifts), there are different attentional 
mechanisms activated when we are perceiving gaze cues versus arrow cues (Hietanen, 
Nummenmaa, Nyman, Parkkola, & Hämäläinen, 2006; Marotta, Lupiáñez, Martella, & Casagrande 
2012). Indeed, there is evidence that different brain networks activate during gaze cueing versus 
cueing by other directional cues (Hietanen et al., 2006; Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic, & Ngan, 2004; 
Ristic, Kelland, Friesen, & Kingstone, 2002). However, it has also been suggested that these 
differences observed might be due to difference in quantity rather than quality (Tipper, Handy, 
Giesbrecht, &  Kingstone, 2008). 
     The reason why gaze and other kind of cues activate different mechanisms in the brain is thought 
to have something to do with social aspects of gaze. According to a meta-analysis of functional 
imaging studies, brain areas involved in eye gaze perception include the superior temporal sulcus 
(STS) region, amygdala, superior parietal lobule, postcentral sulcus, frontal eye field, inferior 
frontal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex (Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009). Gaze perception and 
theory of mind tasks engage similar regions of medial frontal cortex (Calder et al., 2002). To 
support the idea that gaze cueing is indeed special compared to other cues because of its social 
relevance, a study showed that when the same, ambiguous stimulus could be perceived either as a 
pair of eyes under a hat or as a car, the cueing effect was observed only when the stimulus was 
perceived as eyes, but not when exactly the same stimulus was perceived as a car (Ristic & 
Kingstone, 2005). Also, in the same study, it was observed that when the stimulus was first 
introduced as a car the cueing effect did not occur, but when the stimulus was introduced after this 
as eyes, the cueing effect was observed. However, if the stimulus was first introduced as a pair of 
eyes, the cueing effect continued to occur also after the stimulus was reintroduced as a car. So, the 
eyes could no more be “unseen” and “redefined” as a car even though instructed otherwise  (a 
similar phenomenon of an ambiguous stimulus continued to be seen as a face, Bentin & Golland, 
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2002).  
      Another example of top-down control processes affecting gaze cueing is that gaze cueing can be 
disrupted if there is no joint attention (Kawai, 2011). In the study, when a schematic face’s line of 
sight to target stimulus was blocked by a vertical bar, also the gaze cueing effect was disrupted. 
When the line of sight to the target stimulus was not blocked, the gaze cueing effect was observed. 
In conclusion, gaze cueing is automatic in the sense that it occurs without or despite conscious 
effort, but it is not immune to top-down control processes. 
     In real life we do not encounter only averted gazes, but also gazes directed at us. A gaze directed 
at oneself may mean that the gazer is about to approach, and one should prepare accordingly. 
According to an fMRI study, eye contact and hearing one’s name called activate the same regions in 
the brain (Kampe, Frith, & Frith, 2003). Direct gaze, compared to averted gaze, can elicit a relative 
left-sided asymmetry in electroencephalographic brain activity linked to approach tendency, as well 
as larger skin conductance responses indicating more intense autonomic activation (Hietanen, 
Leppänen, Peltola, Linna-aho, & Ruuhiala, 2008). In a PET study it was found that the right 
amygdala and other areas in the limbic system showed increased activity to eye contact compared to 
averted gaze, suggesting that eye contact may induce stronger emotional responses than averted 
gaze (Kawashima et al. 1999).  Indeed, eye contact has been associated with heightened arousal 
(Conty, Russo, et al. 2010; Hietanen, Leppänen, Peltola, et al., 2008; Myllyneva, Ranta, & 
Hietanen, 2015), and it evokes greater activity in the STS than averted gaze (Conty, N’Diaye, Tijus, 
& George, 2007; Pelphrey, Viola, & McCarthy, 2004).  
     There are studies that have indicated that eye contact may capture the attention and hold it in a 
way that shifting the attention away from the eyes to target stimuli takes longer than it would take 
from closed eyes (Conty, Gimmig, Belletier, George, & Huguet, 2010; Senju & Hasegawa, 2005) or 
averted gaze (Conty, Gimmig, et al., 2010; Senju & Hasegawa, 2005). Also, direct gaze is detected 
faster than averted gaze (Conty, Tijus, Hugueville, Coelho, & George, 2006; Senju & Hasegawa, 
2006). People are more accurate at detecting gaze changing from averted gaze to direct gaze than 
from direct gaze changing to averted gaze, and better at detecting gaze changing from direct to 
averted or averted to direct gaze than averted gaze changing laterally to the left or to the right 
(Yokoyama, Ishibashi, Hongoh, & Kita, 2011). In a study where participants were to detect 
appearance of a peripheral target while viewing a picture of a face with direct gaze, vertically 
averted gaze or closed eyes, it was found that detection of the target took longer when viewing 
direct gaze compared to vertically averted gaze or closed eyes (Senju & Hasegawa, 2005). In this 
study there were two different conditions, an overlap condition and a gap condition. In the gap 
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condition there was a gap between the face stimulus offset and target stimulus onset, whereas in the 
overlap condition the face stimulus remained present when the target stimulus appeared in the 
periphery. The detection of the peripheral target stimulus took longer when the stimulus face had 
direct gaze compared to averted gaze or closed eyes, but this differentiation was only seen in the 
overlap condition and not observed in the gap condition. Authors suggested that direct gaze, being 
socially and communicatively relevant stimulus, caused difficulties in disengaging from it. 
     Although gazing (eye contact) is usually interpreted as an invitation for interaction, it may as 
well be interpreted as threatening depending on, for example, facial expression and situational 
factors (Kleinke, 1986). In other animals straight gaze is usually interpreted as a threat (Emery, 
2000) and adolescents with social anxiety respond to eye contact aversely, assessing being subjected 
to direct gaze as unpleasant whereas controls without social anxiety assess the direct gaze directed 
at them as mildly pleasant  (Myllyneva et al., 2015). Thus, direct gaze can elicit different reactions 
to it depending on a range of situational as well as personal factors. However, as gaze directed at 
ourselves implies that the gazer is attending towards us, it is important to start to form a suitable 
reaction to an anticipated interaction.  
 
 
Gaze and theory of mind 
 
 
As mentioned previously, theory of mind is the ability to understand the mental states of others (eg. 
Baron-Cohen, 1995). Although taking another person's perspective is thought to be a complex, 
learned process, there is also evidence that there may be some more automatic aspects to the theory 
of mind (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010; Schneider, Bayliss, 
Becker, & Dux, 2012) that emerge even as early as at the age of 7 months (Kovács, Téglás, & 
Endress 2010). Indeed, it has been proposed that there are two systems tracking others’ beliefs: one 
that is automatic and cognitively efficient yet limited, and another that is cognitively more 
demanding but also more flexible (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). This first system can be thought to 
encode others’ beliefs in a similar way we encode observable input (Kovács et al., 2010), whereas 
the other system is needed in more complex situations such as false-belief tasks or when lying to 
someone. What comes to perceiving others’ gaze direction and theory of mind processes elicited by 
it, both systems can be at work: we may simply encode where they are looking at and quickly 
conclude that the thing they are looking at is not relevant to us, or we may continue to process why 
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they are looking at that thing and would it be relevant to us to also engage in the same thing. There 
is evidence that gaze cueing can be affected by mental state attribution even when participants are 
not asked to encode others’ mental states (Kawai, 2011; Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010). 
     Do we attach mental states to pictures of faces or schematic faces with varying gaze directions? 
We must have at least the ability to do since people can attach mental states even to simple 
geometric shapes (Heider & Simmel, 1944) and surely it appears we actually do so (eg. Baron-
Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995; Bayliss et al, 2013; Kawai, 2013; 
Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2005). But how do schematic faces or pictures of faces compare to 
live, real life faces they are representing? Interestingly, some studies have found that using live 
faces instead of pictures of faces have resulted in differences that were detected only when using 
live faces but not when using pictures of faces (Hietanen, Leppänen, Peltola, et al., 2008; Pönkänen, 
Peltola, & Hietanen, 2011; Pönkänen, Alhoniemi, Leppänen, & Hietanen, 2011; Pönkänen et al., 
2008). For example, in an event-related potential (ERP) study, it was found that face-sensitive ERPs 
(N170 and EPN) were greater for direct vs averted or closed eyes only when the stimulus was a live 
face, not when the participants were presented a picture of the same face (Pönkänen, Alhoniemi, et 
al., 2011). The researchers hypothesized that this could be because of the social, potentially even 
interactional nature of the stimulus. Direct gaze and averted gaze have been found to elicit frontal 
EEG asymmetry, but only when faces were seen live, not when participants were viewing a picture 
(Hietanen, Leppänen, Peltola, et al., 2008). In the same study also skin conductance responses were 
higher to direct gaze compared to averted gaze only when viewing live faces, indicating heightened 
arousal when viewing direct gaze live. So the use of pictures of faces instead of actual humans is 
not as clear cut as one could expect when studying and making interpretations regarding facial 
processing. Showing pictures of faces on a computer screen instead of actual faces have clear 
methodological advantages, since they are easier to control meticulously. However, if at the price of 
absolute control we may gain more ecological validity and thus, more generalizable knowledge we 
should try to pursue it.  
     Similar steps towards ecological validity were taken in a cueing study, where participants 
viewed a “live” video of a model wearing goggles and turning his head to the left or right (Teufel et 
al., 2010). In the study it was observed, that participants’ gaze following behavior was affected by 
the assumption whether the model could see through the goggles or not. Participants were 
successfully led to believe that they saw a live video link coming from an adjacent room, thus 
creating a more naturalistic (potentially more social) setting compared to static images shown on a 
computer screen. In reality they were watching prerecorded video sequences. The participants were 
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asked to fixate the center of the screen and to discriminate the letters (“L” or “T”) appearing beside 
the video as quickly as possible. They were told that the other person (the model wearing goggles) 
in the “live video link” was participating in another study conducted at the same time and turning 
his head either left or right. In Experiment 1, a nonpredictive design was used and participants were 
told the head turn does not indicate where the letter will appear, whereas in Experiment 2, there was 
a counterpredictive design and the participants were told the letter would be twice as likely to 
appear on the side away from where the other person gazes. Before the actual task, the participants 
were introduced to the goggles the model (“other participant”) was wearing during the experiment 
the lenses of both goggles were highly mirrored and on the outside the lenses looked similar. On the 
inside, however, the other pair was transparent allowing the model to see through them and the 
other pair was opaque thus blocking the model’s view. Through this manipulation of the goggles, 
the participants were to attribute either “seeing” or “nonseeing” mental state to the model. In the 
nonpredictive design gaze cueing effect was stronger in the seeing condition compared to nonseeing 
condition, and in the counterpredictive design seeing condition reduced attention shifts away from 
the model’s gaze direction compared to nonseeing condition. Taken together, the results suggest 
that simply attributing “seeing” mental state to a model created a bias to attend toward the model’s 
gaze direction even when it was nonpredictive or even counterpredictive to the target stimulus. 
Importantly, the mental state attribution was the only thing manipulated. In another study, where 
simply the mental beliefs of being seen or not were manipulated, the researchers found 
differentiated physiological responses to direct compared to averted gaze only when the observers 
attributed the “seeing” mental state to the model although from the observers perspective the 
stimulus remained identical (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015). In this study a live model was used as 
stimulus and participants’ belief of being seen or not was obtained through a one-way mirror deceit. 
The participants were lead to believe that a one-way mirror was placed between them and the model 
and thus the model could no longer see them even though the participants continued to be able to 
see the model. Social presence and self-awareness were measured with self-assessment forms and 
results revealed that public self-awareness and social presence were evaluated to be higher when the 
model could see the participant compared to situation where the model could not see the participant. 
The results supported the authors’ hypothesis that the critical factor for “differences in 
physiological and self-assessed measures in seeing a real person and seeing a picture” is “the 
observer’s knowledge of being the target of another individual’s attention or not”.  
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Current study 
 
 
The aim of this study was to find if one’s mental attributions of being seen have an impact on one’s 
attention shifting in a simple gaze cueing task measuring reaction times to laterally presented target 
stimulus. Another aim was to study if one’s mental attributions of being seen have an impact on 
reaction times to laterally presented target stimulus when viewing direct gaze, which is expected to 
capture and hold the attention of the observer. Hence this study consisted of two different tasks: the 
Gaze cueing task and another further referred to as the Attentional capture task. In the Gaze cueing 
task the participants’ looked at a live model whose gaze was averted either to the left or to the right. 
In the Attentional capture task the live model looked either straight (eye contact) or down 
(downward averted gaze). In both tasks the participants’ objective was to detect a light presented 
either to the left or to the right of the fixation stimulus face by a press of a button. The model’s gaze 
was static which allowed exact stimulus onset asynchronies (time interval between stimulus 
appearance and target stimulus appearance) to be determined. In this study stimulus onset 
asynchronies of 200, 500, and 1000 ms were used to investigate the time course of gaze cueing 
effect and attentional capture linked to eye contact. 
     Both tasks were conducted in two different conditions: see through –condition (ST) and blocked 
vision –condition (BV). In the ST-condition the participants believed that the live model was able to 
see through the shutter that was in between the model and the participant. In the BV-condition the 
participants believed that the model could not see through the shutter because of a one-way mirror. 
So here we used the same mirror deceit as in the study by Myllyneva and Hietanen (2015). These 
conditions were reminiscent also of those in Teufel et al. (2010) study, where they used goggles to 
manipulate the belief of whether or not the model could see. In contrast to Teufel et al. (2010) study, 
in this study the participants could see the eyes of the model and the stimulus remained static. The 
head remained facing forward and only the gaze direction varied across trials. The participants 
filled out questionnaires about self-reported social presence both in ST- and BV-condition similarly 
as in Myllyneva and Hietanen (2015) study.  
     For the Gaze cueing task, the hypothesis was that the gaze cueing effect (shorter reaction times 
to validly cued trials compared to invalidly cued trials) would be observed in ST-condition and in 
the BV–condition, but that the cueing effect would be larger when participants believed that also the 
live model could see through the shutter (as in Experiment 1 in Teufel et al., 2010). 
     For the Attentional capture task, the hypothesis was that reaction times would be longer when 
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model poses eye contact compared to when model poses downward gaze, similarly as in Senju and 
Hasegawa’s (2005) study. It was also expected that this phenomenon would be enhanced in ST-
condition since it has been found that mutual eye contact resulted in greater autonomic responses 
associated with attention orienting by motivationally important stimuli (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 
2015).  
     It was also expected that self-reported social presence would be evaluated higher in the ST-
condition than in the BV-condition in both tasks, as was the case in Myllyneva & Hietanen (2015) 
study where the model posed both straight and averted gaze. Social presence is usually 
distinguished from physical presence – physical presence means physically being there whereas 
social presence is tied to feeling of being there physically (Heeter, 2003) or to put it another way, 
not simply existing but actually being present. If the model was able to see through the shutter, 
maybe the participants would feel more socially present in order to be ready for possible interaction 
even though there was no actual reason to anticipate it to happen. In the BV-condition there would 
be even less of a chance of interaction, so maybe participants would feel less socially present than 
in the ST-condition.  
 
 
METHODS 
 
 
Participants 
 
 
The participants were 28 undergraduate students (15 males). All participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were unaware of the purpose of the experiment. The participants 
took part in the experiment voluntarily and gained either a course credit or a movie ticket for 
participation. Eight participants (2 males) were excluded from the analysis, three because there 
were some inconsistencies in the instruction or carrying out the procedure, four because they did not 
believe in the mirror deceit and one because they made too many catch trial errors during the tasks. 
Hence the final sample consisted of 20 participants (13 males) and the mean age of the final sample 
was 22.43 years (age range 19 – 29 years). The participants were debriefed after the experiment.  
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Stimuli 
 
 
The stimulus in the experiment was a face of a live model. Two undergraduate students modelled 
for stimulus faces (a male and a female). In the experiment, the model had four different gaze 
directions: in the Attentional capture task straight gaze or downward gaze, and in the Gaze cueing 
task gaze averted to the left or to the right. The model's head was oriented directly towards the 
participant and the model maintained a neutral expression. The stimulus face was presented through 
a liquid-crystal shutter attached to a panel that was placed between the model and the participant. 
The size of the shutter was 22 cm x 38 cm (width x height). The participant was 85 cm away from 
the shutter and 115 cm away from the model. The participants rested their heads on a chin rest to 
ensure that the distance and height in relation to LEDs remained the same throughout the 
experiment. 
     The target stimulus was a dim LED attached to the panel. There was one LED on each side (left 
and right) of the shutter. The distance between the LEDs was 24 cm and the LEDs were at the 
height of 26 cm as measured from the bottom frame. Since the participants' distance to the lights 
was 85 cm, the LEDs distance from the centre point of the frame was 8° of visual angle.  
     The stimulus presentation was controlled by E-Prime software (E-Prime 2.0, Psychology 
Software Tools). E-Prime controlled the liquid-crystal shutter as well as the LEDs. The shutter 
switched between opaque and transparent state in 1 millisecond.  
 
 
Design 
 
 
There were two different tasks in the experiment. In both tasks, the dependent measure was 
participants’ reaction time (RT) to the target stimulus (an LED). The first task was a Gaze cueing 
task, where the model posed laterally averted gaze. In this task, the gaze was either congruent or 
incongruent in relation to the location of the target stimulus (an LED). The other task was an 
Attentional capture task, where the model posed either a straight gaze or a downwards averted gaze. 
Also in this task, the RTs to the target stimulus were analyzed. 
     Both tasks were carried out in two different conditions: in a “See Through” (ST) -condition 
where the participant believed the model could see him/her through the shutter and in a “Blocked 
Vision” (BV) -condition where the participant believed the model could not see him/her through the 
shutter. In the ST-condition, the model and the participant were able to see each other when the 
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shutter was in a transparent state. The participants were told that the model could also see the LEDs 
turn on, even though this was not actually the case. This was to enable the participant to adopt an 
illusion of “seeing something shared”, something that they both could perceive. In the BV-condition 
(“Blocked Vision”) the participants were led to believe that a one-way mirror was added between 
the model and the participant so that the model could not see the participant or the LED lights even 
though the participant was still able to see the model and the LEDs. 
     Trials in both the Gaze cueing task and Attentional capture task were similar. Each trial began 
with the shutter being in an opaque state. Then the shutter switched to a transparent state and the 
participant saw the model. After either 200, 500, or 1000 ms one of the LEDs attached to the sides 
of the shutter turned on and the participant was to press the button in the response box as soon as 
he/she perceived the light. Immediately after pressing the button the shutter switched back to an 
opaque state, the LED turned off, and there was a 2000 ms interval before the next trial began. 
During this time the model received information via earbuds of the next gaze direction and prepared 
accordingly. If the participant did not press the button at all, the shutter switched back to opaque 
after 2000 ms.  
     The Gaze cueing task consisted of 264 trials (132 for ST-condition and 132 for BV-condition). 
These included 24 catch trials when the LED light did not lit at all. The purpose of this was to 
encourage participants not to press the button before they actually perceived the light. Ergo, there 
were 240 actual trials in the task, 20 trials for each experimental condition (condition x stimulus 
onset asynchrony x gaze congruency). These details were the same for the Attentional capture task 
as well, 20 trials for each experimental condition (condition x stimulus onset asynchrony x gaze 
direction). 
     The gaze directions were balanced so that in the Gaze cueing task there were as many congruent 
as incongruent gaze trials (also as many left averted as right averted gazes) and in the Attentional 
capture task there were as many straight gazes as there were downward averted gazes. Both tasks 
had three different SOAs (stimulus onset asynchronies): 200 ms, 500 ms and 1000 ms. This was to 
ensure that the participants would not learn when the light was about to turn on and press the button 
automatically after a known period of time. Another reason for different SOAs was to investigate 
the time course of gaze cueing effect and attentional capture effect linked to direct gaze. There were 
an equal number of trials in each SOA. All of the trial attributes were (pseudo)randomized so that 
there would not be more than three same gaze directions or gaze congruence conditions or SOAs in 
a row. The location of the LEDs were also balanced and randomized so that the light would not lit 
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more than three times in a row on the same side (left or right). The gender of the model was also 
balanced across female and male participants. 
 
 
Procedure 
 
 
When the participants arrived to the laboratory, the experimenter described the general procedure 
and showed how the liquid-crystal shutter functioned. The participants were told that the purpose of 
this experiment was to study the effect of seeing a face on attention and that this would be measured 
with reaction times. The experimenter was careful not to mention that the actual interest was in the 
gaze direction of the model and not merely the presence of a face. After this, a written consent was 
gathered and the participant received more detailed instructions. The participant was told that 
his/her task was to look at the model's face, while keeping his/her eyes at the centre and press the 
button on the response box with their dominant hands’ index finger as soon as they perceived an 
LED light lit either on the left or the right side of the shutter. The participant was also told about the 
catch trials and advised not to press the response key before the LED was lit. The participant was 
asked to keep looking at the eyes of the model (or between the model's eyes, if the former felt 
uncomfortable) and not to shift their eyes towards the LEDs at any time. They were reassured that 
they could still see the lights with their peripheral vision. 
     After instructions, the participant was introduced to a one-way mirror used in the BV-condition. 
The participant was explained that by adding a special one-way mirror between the model and the 
participant, the model could no longer see through the shutter even though the participants view did 
not change. In reality there was not a one-way mirror, but a deceit was carried out by the model first 
placing a transparent sheet on the shutter window in such a way, that the participant saw that 
something was added on the shutter. Then the experimenter and the participant walked to the other 
side of the shutter to see that the “mirror” actually blocked the vision from the model's side. While 
the participant was walking to the other side of the partition, the model quickly placed another, 
opaque aluminum-coloured sheet in front of the shutter so that the view was actually blocked. When 
the participant reached the model's side of the shutter, he/she saw that the sheet actually was opaque 
in nature and the view was blocked from that side of the shutter. While the participant returned back 
to his/her own seat, the model quietly but quickly removed the lastly added opaque sheet leaving 
the participant to believe that the firstly inserted (transparent) sheet actually blocked the view from 
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the model's side of the shutter. The participant was asked to keep in mind whether the mirror was in 
place or not so that they would be aware of the condition during the task. 
     Then both the LED lights were lit so that the participant could advice the model to sit at the 
centre of the shutter from the participants point of view, and also that the model's eyes were at the 
same level with the LEDs. After this the participant was reminded shortly of the instructions, and a 
block of practice trials was carried out so that the participant became familiar with the experiment. 
The test block consisted of 20 trials including catch trials. The practice block was always run 
without the mirror.  
     After the practice block the participant filled a modified Social Presence Form (SPF) 
questionnaire (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015) based on how they felt during the practice block. Then 
the experimenter prepared the participant for the actual block by telling that it is exactly like the 
practice block, but only longer and would last for a few minutes. If there were no questions from the 
participant, the experimenter reminded the participant about which condition was to take place (ST 
or BV) and, depending on the task, told that the model was either looking downwards or directly at 
the participant (Attentional capture task), or either to the left or to the right (Gaze cueing task).  
     The experiment then went on so that the participant completed the first task (Gaze cueing or 
Attentional capture) in the first condition (ST or BV) and filled out the SPF form. Then the 
participant continued to second task in this same condition and filled out the SPF form. Only after 
this the condition was changed and the participant completed both tasks in this latter condition.     
Between each task there was a pause during which the model and the participant could rest for a 
while. After each pause and at the beginning of every task the position of the model was corrected if 
needed. Also after each pause and at the beginning of every task the participant was reminded of the 
nature of the condition (if the mirror was there or not).  
     When the experiment was over the participant was asked how they felt about the experiment and 
whether they felt any different during the different tasks or conditions. The debriefing was carried 
out and mirror deceit was revealed. The participants were asked directly if they had suspected that 
the model could see them in the BV-condition. If a participant expressed doubts about the mirror 
deceit, the participant was excluded from the analysis.  
 
 
Data analysis 
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First it was analyzed that the participants had not pressed the button in the catch trials too often 
(acceptable error rate was set to be at ≤10 %). One participant had done this and was excluded from 
the final analysis. The catch trial error rate in the final sample ranged between 0–4.2 % and average 
catch trial error rate was 1.6 %. For the remaining participants, catch trial errors were not included 
in the analysis. Reaction times shorter than 100 ms and longer than 1000 ms were removed before 
the analysis. After this, each participants’ mean reaction time was calculated, and reaction times 
falling outside the window of mean +/- 2 SD were also removed. After this filtering the mean 
reaction time for each stimulus condition was calculated for each participant. 
     For the social presence measurement, the items in the modified SPF –questionnaire (Myllyneva 
& Hietanen, 2015) that needed to be reversed were reversed, and the mean score was calculated for 
each participant. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
Gaze cueing task 
 
 
Reaction times were subjected to a three-way repeated measures ANOVA: 2 (Condition: See 
Through/ Blocked Vision) x 2 (Gaze congruency: congruent gaze/ incongruent gaze) x 3 (SOA: 
200/500/1000 ms). The main effect of Gaze Congruency was significant (F(1,19) = 23.9 p < 0.001). 
Reaction times were shorter for congruent gaze (   = 290 ms) than for incongruent gaze (   = 295 ms). 
     The main effect of the SOA was also significant (F(2,38) = 20.5, p < 0.001). Pairwise comparisons 
indicated that reaction times were longer at the SOA of 200 ms (   = 309 ms) compared to SOAs of 
500 ms (   = 284 ms , t(19)  = 5.9, p < 0.001) and 1000 ms (   = 286 ms, t(19)  = 4.0, p < 0.001).  
     Neither the main effect of Condition nor any interactions were significant (all ps > 0.3). The 
mean reaction times are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The mean reaction times (and SDs) in the Gaze cueing task. 
 See Through –condition Blocked Vision –condition 
SOA Congruent gaze Incongruent gaze   Congruent gaze   Incongruent gaze 
  200   ms 308  (58.5) 313  (60.1) 304  (55.8) 310  (57.8) 
  500   ms 284  (45.8) 287  (50.7) 279  (43.3) 286  (41.9) 
1000   ms 285  (42.6) 290  (43.5) 282  (35.4) 286  (38.7) 
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     The self-evaluation ratings of social presence were subjected to a t-test. Scale range in scores 
was 1–7. There was no difference between the Blocked Vision –condition (x     .75) and the See 
Through –condition (x     . 1) in the self-reported social presence (t(19) = 0.7, p > 0.5). 
 
 
Attentional capture task 
 
 
Reaction times were subjected to a three-way repeated measures ANOVA: 2 (Condition: See 
Through/Blocked Vision) x 2 (Gaze direction: straight gaze/ downward gaze) x 3 (SOA: 
200/500/1000 ms). The main effect of the SOA was significant (F(2,38) = 50.0, p < 0.001). Again, the 
reaction times were longer at the SOA of 200 ms (   = 317 ms) compared to SOAs of 500 ms (   = 
288 ms , t(19)  = 7.7, p < 0.001) and 1000 ms (   = 290 ms, t(19) = 6.2, p < 0.001). Other main effects 
were non-significant (both ps > 0.1). 
     There was also a significant interaction of Gaze direction x SOA (F(2,38) = 6.4, p < 0.01). Because 
of the significant two-way interaction, the effect of gaze direction was analyzed separately at each 
SOA. T-tests indicated that reaction times were shorter for straight gaze compared to downward 
gaze at the SOA of 500 ms (t(19)  = 3.6, p < 0.01).  
     There was also a significant three-way interaction of Condition x Gaze direction x SOA (F(2,38) = 
3.3, p < 0.05). Because of the significant three-way interaction, the effect of gaze direction was 
analyzed separately at each SOA and condition. However, further t-tests did not confirm this 
observed three way interaction. By looking at Figure 1, it appears that the observed three-way 
interaction (not confirmed by the post-hoc analyses) was due to differences at the SOA of 1000 ms. 
Indeed, the difference between reaction times to straight vs downward gaze was approaching 
significance at the SOA of 1000 ms in the BV-condition (p = 0.078) whereas in the ST-condition it 
did not (p = 0.254) Other interactions were non-significant (all ps > 0.2). The mean reaction times 
in the Attentional capture task are presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The mean reaction times in the Attentional capture task. 
 
 
     The self-evaluation ratings of social presence were subjected to a t-test. Scale range in scores 
was 1–7. The social presence was evaluated to be higher in the ST-condition (   = 4.13) compared to 
the BV-condition (   = 3.81) in the Attentional capture task (t(19) = 2.2, p < 0.05). 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate if belief of being seen would affect the attentional orienting 
triggered by gaze direction. Another aim was to study if one’s mental attributions of being seen 
have an impact on reaction times to laterally presented target stimulus when viewing direct gaze, 
which was expected to capture and hold the attention of the observer. The study consisted of simple 
reaction time tasks, where the participants’ task was to react to an LED lit while viewing a live 
model through a liquid-crystal shutter. To investigate the two questions, there were two different 
tasks: a Gaze cueing task where the model looked either to the right or to the left thus having either 
a congruent or incongruent gaze. The other task was called an Attentional capture task, where the 
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model either had straight gaze or a downward averted gaze. Both of these tasks were also carried 
out in two different conditions: in the see-through (ST) condition the participants’ believed the 
model could see through the shutter. In the blocked-vision (BV) condition, the participants’ 
believed the model could not see through the shutter because of an added one-way mirror. There 
were three different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs). That is, how long after the shutter became 
transparent did the target LED lit.  The participants also filled out forms measuring social presence.  
 
 
Results 
 
 
In the Gaze cueing task the only results were that, as expected, the reaction times were shorter when 
the stimulus appeared on the same side the gaze was cueing at, and that reaction times were longest 
at SOA of 200 ms. As already mentioned in the introduction, gaze cueing effect has been widely 
established in a number of studies (eg. Driver et al. 1999; Hietanen, 1999; Schuller & Rossion, 
2001, 2004), so this result was not surprising but rather expected. One could also argue that the 
longest reaction times at 200 ms were also fairly expected simply because of the shorter foreperiod 
(Niemi & Näätänen, 1981). This kind of shortening of reaction times as the SOA lengthened has 
been observed in similar studies where there were different SOAs (eg. Friesen et al., 2004; Hietanen 
& Leppänen, 2003). There was neither main effect of condition (BV or ST), nor any interactions, 
and thus we could not replicate the finding observed in a similar study, that attributing “seeing” 
state to model would enhance the gaze cueing effect (Teufel et al., 2010). Contrary to Teufel et al. 
(2010) study, in this study the stimulus was not dynamic. Could it be that the perception of 
movement contributed to the gaze cueing effect in their study? Motion may have an enhancing 
effect in gaze cueing studies (Farroni et al., 2000; Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007).  
     One possibility of course is, that the participants did not attribute the mental state of seeing or 
not seeing to the model even though they were reminded of the condition before every block. 
Indeed, there was no difference between the ST- and BV-condition in self-reported social presence. 
However, in Teufel et al. (2010) they did not measure social presence and it is not known if social 
presence is actually needed for the enhanced cueing effect they observed in “seeing” condition. In 
their experiment however, the participant did not have to rely on their memory to remember which 
condition was in question (“seeing” or “nonseeing”) because of the different colored goggles. It is 
possible that in this study the participants forgot the condition as the block continued or did not pay 
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enough attention to which condition was in question – both ST- and BV-condition looked identical 
to the participants and the blocks were quite long in duration. 
     In the Attentional capture task reaction times were again longest at SOA of 200 ms. Other main 
effects were non-significant. There was a significant interaction of SOA and gaze direction and 
further analyses revealed that reaction times were shorter for straight gaze than downward gaze at 
the SOA of 500 ms. This was against the hypothesis that eye contact would capture attention, thus 
making reaction times longer and therefore did not replicate the findings of a similar study also 
using an SOA of 500 ms (Senju & Hasegawa, 2005). In their study they used pictures of faces 
whereas we used live models. Could it be that the live model was a socially stronger stimulus and 
therefore cued attention downward (Teufel et al., 2010)? Then, in contrast, Senju and Hasegawa’s 
study (2005) the picture of a face with downward gaze may not have been a socially strong enough 
stimulus to cue attention downward. However, if we assume this to be the case, then why did the 
use of live model not also enhance the attentional capture of straight gaze perceived by Senju and 
Hasegawa (2005)?  
    Another difference to Senju and Hasegawa (2005) study is the head deviation, in their study the 
stimulus face had a slightly deviated head orientation whereas in this study the head was facing 
forward. However, it is difficult to say if a deviated head view would have had an effect in the 
present study. Maybe direct gaze with deviated head orientation could have initiated even higher 
sense of being watched by another, since with direct head view it is possible to think the other is 
simply “looking forward” and not “looking at me” whereas with deviated head view it is harder to 
explain why the other one would be looking at my direction but not me.  Direct gaze is detected 
faster than averted gaze among distractors of averted gazes (for averted gaze search the distractors 
were straight gazes) but only with deviated head (Conty et al., 2006). Eyes are not the only thing we 
can use to determine others’ focus of attention, but we can also use the head or body direction as a 
clue if eyes are invisible (Emery, 2000). The hierarchy is that if eyes are visible, then the eyes are 
the best clue to determine the focus of their attention. Since the orientation of eyes, head and body 
are often in line, deviated head with straight gaze may be more powerfully signaling the attention is 
actually at the observer. However, differentiated physiological reactions to eye contact compared to 
averted gaze, which have been hypothesized to be caused by mentalizing processes, have been 
found with straight head orientation (eg. Hietanen, Leppänen, Peltola, et al., 2008; Myllyneva & 
Hietanen, 2015; Myllyneva et al., 2015; Pönkänen, Alhoniemi et al., 2011). 
     There was a three-way interaction of gaze direction, SOA and condition in the Attentional 
capture task. Further analyses did not confirm this interaction but, as already mentioned in results, 
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looking at Figure 1 it looks the reason for this interaction was at the SOA of 1000 ms. Indeed the 
difference between reaction times to direct vs downward gaze was approaching significance at the 
SOA of 1000 ms in the BV-condition (p = 0,078) whereas in the ST-condition it did not (p = 0,254). 
Maybe with a larger number of participants this trend would have been observed. If so, could the 
relatively longer reaction times to direct gaze in ST-condition be because of Senju & Hasegawa’s 
(2005) observation of attentional capture and holding? They observed the increased dwell time in 
direct gaze only at shorter SOA of 500 ms but not with longer SOA of 1200 ms which is closer to 
1000 ms used in current study. One explanation could be that straight gaze began to be disturbing 
only after participants judged it as prolonged and thus mentalizing processes (why is he/she looking 
at me for so long?) occupied more of processing capacity resulting in longer reaction times (Conty, 
Gimmig, et al., 2010) and maybe even elicited stronger emotional reactions (Kawashima et al., 
1999). Certainly, the social presence was rated to be higher in the ST-condition in this task, but it 
cannot be said to be because of direct gaze since both gaze directions were included in the 
assessment. As mentioned previously, with direct head view it is maybe easier to judge the other 
one as simply looking forward but not at us. 
     The social presence was rated higher in the ST-condition compared to BV-condition in the 
Attentional capture task. However there was no significant difference in social presence in the Gaze 
cueing task. This raises a question whether the eye contact was the sole contributor in observed 
differences in social presence between the conditions of being seen or not in Myllyneva and 
Hietanen (2015) study where direct gaze and laterally averted gazes were used. Again, it would be 
tempting to assume that here the direct gaze was indeed the cause for higher social presence scores, 
but since both direct and downward gaze were included in the assessment the issue cannot be 
resolved here either. However, here the difference between the two conditions most likely means 
that participants remembered which condition was taking place when doing the task even though 
the duration was equal to the Gaze cueing task. It is still possible that the participants remembered 
the conditions also in the Gaze cueing task, but they did not result to differences in social presence. 
 
 
Limitations and future implications 
 
 
The sample size in this study was relatively small (n=20), which may explain why the post-hoc 
analyses conducted after the three-way interaction did not result in significant effects. However, this 
sample size is well in line with other gaze cueing studies (eg. n=8 and n=9 in Driver et al., 1999; 
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n=14 in Schuller & Rossion, 2001; n=12 in Schuller & Rossion, 2004; n=32 and n=16 in Teufel et 
al., 2010). 
    The use of a live model instead of pictorial stimuli naturally decreases the level of control. There 
is a possibility for human error when live models are posing, since they may, for example, 
unconsciously pose a bit different micro facial expressions in different conditions even though 
trying to maintain a neutral expression. If there had been a real one-way mirror (that would not 
change the participants’ view to the model at all) to be used, the issue with models’ posing would 
still remain. This loss of control in stimulus presentation is hard to get around. Teufel et al. (2010) 
did this by pre-recorded videos, but even in this case it has to be noticed that video link is no longer 
face-to-face interaction even if it may be the closest possible way to mimic face-to-face interaction. 
However, because of using live models instead of pictorial stimuli may produce different 
physiological reactions (eg. Hietanen, Leppänen, Peltola, et al., 2008; Pönkänen, Alhoniemi, et al., 
2011; Pönkänen et al., 2008; Pönkänen, Peltola et al., 2011), in the future gaze cueing studies, as 
well as other studies, using live models should continue to be pursued. 
    The use of downward gaze as control stimulus for direct gaze may have been a mistake, if the 
downward gaze indeed cued attention downward. It would have been possible to use closed eyes as 
a control stimulus (Senju & Hasegawa, 2005), but using closed eyes as the only control stimulus 
could be problematic because of the arguably rare occurrence of perceiving closed eyes on an 
awake person.  Perhaps the combination of all these three gaze conditions could be investigated in 
the future. 
    Another interesting question would be, if eye contact could be the reason for the higher social 
presence ratings in the ST-condition over BV-condition. There is intuitive appeal for this because of 
direct gaze’s communicative meaning (eg. Kleinke, 19 6). To investigate this, eye contact would 
have to be presented alone. But if this is done, it is likely that the meaning of the experiment would 
be revealed to participants and thus they might give answers that they would expect the researchers 
hope for. Therefore there should be a “dummy task” to cover the real interest of the experiment, 
maybe even a reaction time task as in this study, but direct gaze and averted gaze should be 
presented in different blocks. 
    There is a question to be raised about simplifying even the current study. It could have been 
beneficial to investigate the hypotheses in two different experiments using two samples. Then the 
length of the experiment would have diminished and thus, perhaps, making it easier for the 
participants to remember which condition (BV or ST) was in question. It might be that the design 
was too complicated in that there were two different tasks and filling of questionnaires before the 
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condition change. Maybe these distracted the participants and they did not bear in mind which 
condition was taking place clearly enough to result in significant differences between the 
conditions. 
    One possible reason for the inability to replicate Teufel et al. (2010) findings is that participants 
did not actually remember which condition was taking place after the beginning of the block. 
Perhaps in the future this issue could be circulated by adding something to remind participants of 
the condition (for example a small light) that would be balanced between participants. Another 
possible solution is to make the experiment shorter. This could be attained by focusing on fewer 
SOAs at a time. Another possible reason for the inability to replicate findings could be, as 
mentioned previously, the static stimulus. Lachat, Conty, Hugueville, and George (2012) have 
already showed that gaze cueing studies can be done using live model and dynamic gaze, however 
in that case determining exact SOAs is not possible and would probably require videotaping thus 
adding more effort required to carrying out and analyzing in the experiment. 
    All in all, there were left a number of questions as to why we were not able to replicate the 
previous findings and contrary to our hypotheses, belief of being seen did not affect attentional 
orienting triggered by gaze direction. However, in this study we confirmed that gaze cueing is 
possible to investigate using live model (also Lachat et al., 2012). This study also gave some 
confirmation that the mirror deceit can be used to study beliefs of being seen or not, in that 
participants were surprised to learn about the deceit (also Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015; Myllyneva 
et al., 2015). However, it seems that without reminders or clues of which condition is in question 
the belief of being seen or not may not be attributed, may be forgotten or it loses its power in 
temporally long lasting experiments. 
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